Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate
Committee, and Senate
The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is an infrequent event of major significance in American politics. Each appointment is important because of the enormous judicial power the Supreme Court exercises as the highest appellate court in the federal judiciary. Appointments are infrequent, as a vacancy on the nine- member Court may occur only once or twice, or never at all, during a particular President’s years in office. Under the Constitution, Justices on the Supreme Court receive lifetime appointments. Such job security in the government has been conferred solely on judges and, by constitutional design, helps insure the Court’s independence from the President and Congress.
The procedure for appointing a Justice is provided for by the Constitution in only a few words. The “Appointments Clause” (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint … Judges of the supreme Court.” The process of appointing Justices has undergone changes over two centuries, but its most basic feature — the sharing of power between the President and Senate — has remained unchanged: To receive lifetime appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is played midway in the process (after the President selects, but before the Senate considers) by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
On rare occasions, Presidents also have made Court appointments without the Senate’s consent, when the Senate was in recess. Such “recess appointments,” however, were temporary, with their terms expiring at the end of the Senate’s next session. The last recess appointments to the Court, made in the 1950s, were controversial, because they bypassed the Senate and its “advice and consent” role.
The appointment of a Justice might or might not proceed smoothly. Since the appointment of the first Justices in 1789, the Senate has confirmed 120 Supreme Court nominations out of 154 received. Of the 34 unsuccessful nominations, 11 were rejected in Senate roll-call votes, while nearly all of the rest, in the face of committee or Senate opposition to the nominee or the President, were withdrawn by the President or were postponed, tabled, or never voted on by the Senate.
Over more than two centuries, a recurring theme in the Supreme Court appointment process has been the assumed need for excellence in a nominee. However, politics also has played an important role in Supreme Court appointments. The political nature of the appointment process becomes especially apparent when a President submits a nominee with controversial views, there are sharp partisan or ideological differences between the President and the Senate, or the outcome of important constitutional issues before the Court is seen to be at stake.
This report will be updated as events warrant. See CRS Multimedia MM70010, The Supreme Court Appointment Process, for a video presentation using both historical pictures and motion picture footage from more
With Justice Antonin Scalia’s death this weekend, and its nearly instantaneous politicization, it’s worth asking why we don’t subject our high court justices to limited terms or mandatory retirement ages — like nearly every other country in the world.
Are term limits even a good idea? A lot of sharp thinkers on both sides of the political aisle think so. Norm Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute likes the idea of an 18-year term limit, saying it would “would to some degree lower the temperature on confirmation battles by making the stakes a bit lower. And it would mean a Court that more accurately reflects the changes and judgments of the society.”
Law professor Erwin Chemerinsky likes the 18-year proposal too. “Eighteen years is long enough to allow a justice to master the job, but not so long as to risk creating a court that reflects political choices from decades earlier,” he wrote in 2013.
“The Constitution was written at a time when life tenure meant living into your 50s because that’s what life expectancy was,” legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin, author of two books on the Supreme Court, has noted. “Thirty-year tenures are not what the framers had in mind.”
by Nick Tomboulides
The Supreme Court is back in the spotlight, as the nation debates how to fill the seat of the late Antonin Scalia. This somber occasion got us reflecting on the time we went before the Supreme Court, to advocate on the people’s behalf for congressional term limits.
The year was 1995, and the case was U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton. With assistance from USTL, the citizens of 23 states had just passed laws putting term limits on their members of Congress. That meant just under half of all congressmen were term-limited, and Congress would soon be forced to propose a term limits amendment applying to everyone.
But it was not to be. A self-interested politician in Arkansas and his donors made a court challenge to void that state’s law. Others followed. After the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled against us, we took it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court decided, in a 5-4 split decision, that citizens are not allowed to term limit their own members of Congress using state laws. They threw out 23 states’ term limits laws in one day. Justice Scalia disagreed, ruling for term limits as part of the dissenting minority.
This was without doubt a low point for term limits. The Court seemed to have shut down every realistic avenue to fight careerism in Washington.
But hidden in their decision was a silver lining:
“State imposition of term limits for congressional service would effect such a fundamental change in the constitutional framework that it must come through a constitutional amendment properly passed under the procedures set forth in Article V.”
Did you catch that? While they had closed the door to term-limiting Congress with state laws, they had opened another by saying it can be done through amendment to the Constitution. That’s the strategy USTL is pursuing today.
The Term Limits Convention uses “the procedures set forth in Article V” to achieve congressional term limits. The Convention is not a state law like those the Court struck down – it is a constitutional call-to-action that comes together when 34 state legislatures have demanded it.
Florida was the first state to make the call, but a dozen more are hot on its heels.
The 1995 decision U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton will never be forgotten. Nor will Scalia. As we remember the role the Supreme Court once played in stopping term limits, we can look forward to the opening it underscored to make congressional term limits a reality.
Nick Tomboulides is the Executive Director of U.S. Term Limits.
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The lesson they do not teach in law schools or high school civics classes: the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction
Part 1: Article III federal courts versusUnited States District Courts
The Constitution creates the judicial power of the national government at Article 3 § 1 and delineates the character of the controversies to which the judicial power extends at Article 3 § 2(1); to wit, respectively and in pertinent part:
“Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. . . .
“Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States will be a party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In a judicial sense, “jurisdiction” (from the Latin jus right, dictio act of saying) means, essentially, the legal power, right, or authority of a court to hear and decide causes and pronounce the sentence of the law within a certain geographic area; to wit:
“forum . . . 2 a : a judicial body or assembly . . . b : the territorial jurisdiction of a court forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised — National Law Journal” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: Springfield, Mass., 1996), p. 201.
“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul. Minn., 1910) (hereinafter “Black’s 2nd”), p. 673.
The true distinction between courts is as to species of jurisdiction, i.e., general or limited; to wit:
“General jurisdiction is that which extends to a great variety of matters. General jurisdiction in law and equity is jurisdiction of every kind that a court can possess, of the person, subject-matter, [and] territorial . . .
“. . . Limited jurisdiction (called, also, specialand inferior) is that which extends only to certain specified causes.” [Emphasis in original.] John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1761.
“—Limited jurisdiction. . . . The true distinction between courts is between such as possess a general and such as have only a special jurisdiction for a particular purpose . . .” Black’s 2nd, p. 673.
It is well settled that trial courts ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the Constitution, supra, are courts of limited jurisdiction, with authority only over certain controversies; to wit:
“The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. . . .” Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006).
“[T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.
“The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).
“[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).
Whereas: Only courts with territorial jurisdiction(an aspect of general jurisdiction) can take cognizance of civil and criminal causes; and
Whereas: All Article III federal trial courts are courts of limited jurisdiction (certain controversies only),
Wherefore: No trial court ordained and established by Congress under Article III of the Constitution is authorized to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes.
Notwithstanding the above blackletter law,Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial ProcedureChapter 176 Federal Debt Collection ProcedureSection 3002 Definitions provides, in pertinent part:
“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (8) ‘Judgment’ means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.”
Whereas: No inferior trial court ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the Constitution is invested with territorial jurisdiction; and
Whereas: No Article III federal trial court has the territorial jurisdiction necessary to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising from a civil or criminal proceeding; and
Whereas: Every United States District Court (28 U.S.C. 132(a)) located throughout the Union takes cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enters judgments arising therefrom; and
Whereas: No Federal trial court can take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising therefrom unless authorized to do so by the Constitution; and
Whereas: Article III of the Constitution is devoid of such authority,
Wherefore: No United States District Court is an Article III court—and we must look elsewhere in the Constitution for the authority that gives United States District Courts the territorial jurisdiction necessary to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, as authorized by statute in 28 U.S.C. 3002(8).
Part 2: Treason to the Constitution
The only provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power to create inferior courts with territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising therefrom, is an implied authority, Article 4 § 3(2), also known as the territorial clause; to wit, in pertinent part:
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”
Whereas: As granted in Article 1 § 8(17) of the Constitution (infra), Congress have power of exclusive legislation (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (supra); to wit:
“Section 8. The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings;”; and
Whereas: The full extent of the “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (id. at 4 § 3(2)) today is the collective of:
the District of Columbia;
Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, and Navassa Island; and
any other “Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings” (id. at 1 § 8(17)); and
Whereas: All courts created by Congress under authority of Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution are legislative Article IV territorial courts of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction); and
Whereas: Every United States District Court is authorized by statute (28 U.S.C. 3002(8)) to exercise general jurisdiction and take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt; and
Whereas: Every United States District Court is authorized at Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution to exercise territorial jurisdiction and “dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”; and
Whereas: Every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union—numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959—is situate without all “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (id.), and
Whereas: There is no constitutional authority for any United States District Court to exercise territorial jurisdiction and take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt anywhere within the exterior limits of the geographic area occupied by the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union; and
Whereas: Every United States District Court doing business within the exterior limits of the Union is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction, under the exclusive control Congress, extending its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed therefor by the Constitution at Article 4 § 3(2) (“Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”), and usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area (the Union), under color of law, office, and authority, and therefore a kangaroo court; and
Whereas: “We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution,” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821),
Wherefore: Every single Congressman, Federal bench officer, and Department of Justice attorney is in violation of his oath of office and culpable for, among numerous other crimes and high crimes: fraud; misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance in public office; misprision of felony; misprision of treason; and treason to the Constitution.
Part 3: Legislative fraud on the part of Congress; connivance therewith on the part of Federal bench officers and Department of Justice attorneys
The only 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) “State” of the 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) “United States” whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code is the Title 26 U.S.C. State of District of Columbia.
Notwithstanding the above statutory fact, bench officers in the Federal judiciary and attorneys in the Department of Justice treat virtually every American as a resident of the District of Columbia: liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code and subject to all other Federal rules and regulations.
Said Federal officers justify this by construing / interpreting any of an unknown number of “acts and statements” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)) arising in the course of normal and ordinary interaction between individual Americans and government agencies / programs, as evidence of “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9)] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)), i.e., the District of Columbia.
Such “acts and statements” include evidence created through the application of one’s signature to a driver’s license application, voter registration form, tax return, application for Social Security benefits, IRS Form W-4, passport application, and any other of the myriad government forms one encounters in the course of his life—and require that the applicant certify that he is a citizen or resident of the (statutory) United Statesor resident of a (statutory) State.
Americans who make such “acts and statements” are deemed to have made a general election (comprehensive choice) to be (1) treated as a resident of the District of Columbia under general legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g)(1) or (h)(1), (2) liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Chapters 1 Normal taxes and surtaxes and 24 Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages, and (3) subject to all legislation within the 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) “United States” (District of Columbia only), not just income-tax statutes; to wit:
“Quando lex est specialis, ratio autem generalis, generaliter lex est intelligenda. When the law is special, but its reason is general, the law is to be understood generally.” Bouvier’s, p. 2156.
We learn from the Supreme Court, however, that such “legislation” is legally fatally flawed, and therefore ultimately unenforceable; because no one can elect (choose)—or appear to elect—to be treated as a resident of a particular place for the purpose of taxation (or any other purpose) without also having a factual presence in that location; to wit:
“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. . . .” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
To acquire residence in a particular place one must do one of two things: (1) establish bodily presence as an inhabitant (by taking up housekeeping in a fixed and permanent abode), or (1) realize earnings (by way of permanency of occupation) from a source located therein.
Wherefore: It is clear that Congress have another master than the American People—and that every Federal bench officer and DOJ attorney is in connivance with Congress and complicit in the legislative fraud and treason to the Constitution.
Part 4: Dealing with the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction
That the statutes of Congress may authorize United States Attorneys to bring suit in United States District Court is insufficient, in and of itself, to vest jurisdiction in any such court; to wit:
“So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts.” Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900).
It is well settled that before a federal judge can rely on the authority of a statute for jurisdiction to hear and decide a particular cause, said judge must confirm that the Constitution has given him the capacity to take it; to wit:
“It remains rudimentary law that “[a]s regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. . . . To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.” The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868) (emphasis added); accord, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800, 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-380, 101 S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420 (1813). [Underline emphasis only added.] Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
Bereft of lawful authority, United States District Courts located within the Union depend utterly upon the ability of their respective bench officers to prevaricate, dissemble, and sidestep issues that would destroy the charade of legitimacy and appearance of impartiality.
Until Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, Objection and Demand and September 30, 2015, Demand for Dismissal, Petitioner had never heard of a Department of Justice attorney failing to respond to a challenge of jurisdiction or a United States District Judge refusing to rule on a motion or abandoning an ongoing case (and failing to provide otherwise for its disposition).
But that is what happened in the Lufkin Division case (see October 28, 2015, post, infra).
Here is the reason:
Anything either DOJ attorney would have said, whether for or against Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, would have amounted to admission of fraud or treason to the Constitution or proof of incompetence.
Whereas, DOJ attorneys can back out of a case without incident, this is not so for a United States District Judge; to wit:
“Judicis officium est opus diei in die suo perficere. It is the duty if a judge to finish the work of each day within that day.” Bouvier’s, p. 2140.
“Boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oritur, et interest republicæ ut sint fines litium. It is the duty of a good judge to prevent litigations, that suit may not grow out of suit, and it concerns the welfare of a state that an end be put to litigation.” Id. at 2127.
The Lufkin Judge has a duty not only to Petitioner, but to the American Republic—by way of his oath of office (5 U.S.C. 3331), to “bear true faith and allegiance” (id.) to the Constitution and“well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office” (id.) of United States District Judge—and conclude the instant litigation; to wit:
“When it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach the merits. In such a situation the action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Melo v. U.S., 505 F.2d 1026.
Instead, the Lufkin Judge went silent.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (to whom Petitioner would appeal for resolution of the instant unresolved motion), explains in United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir., 1970), the significance of the Lufkin Judge’s silence:
“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24
“. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604, 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967).”
Presently, there is a neglected unresolved motion on both the Lufkin and Houston Division Docket.
Notwithstanding the fraudulent statutory definitions of “State” throughout the United States Code, “We are bound to interpret the constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted,” Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
Wherefore, no United States District Judge has constitutional authority to expound or enforce Federal statutes in Texas or any other of the“several States of the Union” (infra) against any American residing there or property located there; to wit:
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State[of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
“Judici officium suum excedenti non paretur. To a judge who exceeds his office (or jurisdiction) no obedience is due,” Bouvier’s, p. 2140, and, as demonstrated hereinabove and elsewhere in this webpage, every United States District Judge and Magistrate in every United States District Court within the Union, in connivance with Congress and conspiracy with officers of the Department of Justice, is exceeding his jurisdiction, beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution, at Article 4 § 3(2), for Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction, and perpetrating the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction.
“Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one,” id. at 2157, and there is nothing prohibiting any other litigant from making the same demands as Petitioner, in any other Federal case, civil or criminal, anywhere in the Union.
No United States District Judge or Magistrate can reply responsively (meaningfully) to a demand for dismissal of a Federal case, civil or criminal, within the Union, for lack of constitutional authority that gives the particular United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in the defendant’s particular county, parish, or borough, without also producing evidence of serious wrongdoing on his part.
Evidently, the Lufkin and Houston Judges have “taken the Fifth” sub silentio and refused to answer their respective unresolved motion on the ground that it may tend to incriminate them.
The Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction can be concealed no longer.
Petitioner is in the process of rectifying matters in these cases, and will report developments as they occur.
* * * *
 blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (hereinafter “Black’s 7th”), p. 163.
 U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, (1) “All OIA Jurisdictions,” and (2) “U.S. Territories under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS): (1) http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm, (2) http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/islandfactsheet2.cfm, respectively.
 COLOR. An appearance, semblance, or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence a deceptive appearance ; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality ; a guise or pretext. . . . Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary(West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st”), p. 222.
 kangaroo court. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding. Black’s 7th, p. 359.
 The 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) Statesare the bodies politic of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and no other. Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, pp. 8–14.
 The 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) United States is the collective of the geographic area occupied by the bodies politic of the six respective 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) States, supra, fn. 5. Id.
 Id. at 15.
 In all Federal law, “State” is a statutory term and means, ultimately, the District of Columbia, id.., which is why use of “State” is avoided in this webpage.
Unpunctuated, grammatically incorrect, two-capital-letter United States Postal Service (“U.S.P.S.”) designators for each of the putative 50 States (50 political subdivisions of the District of Columbia; id. at 11), and ZIP Codes, are political—not geographical— identifiers.
ZIP Codes are assigned to United States Post Offices only, not geographic areas, Domestic Mail Manual (“DMM”) § 602-1.8.1 Purpose of ZIP Code, the purpose of which is to facilitate processing of mail within and between U.S.P.S. facilities only, id. at 708-10.1 and 2—not delivery of mail, id. at 602-1.8.1.
Use of a ZIP Code is voluntary, id. at 602-1.3(e)(2); to wit:
“We note that under section 122.32 of the U.S. Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual, the use of a zip code remains voluntary. See United States Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual § 122.32, at 55 (Mar. 1992). . . .” Joseph Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 966 F.2d 1483, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1123 (1992).
Carrier delivery of mail is free, DMM § 508-4.1.2 Purpose; postage pays for transmission of mail between U.S.P.S. facilities only, id. at 708-10.2 Application.
 pre-var′i-cate . . . v. . . . i. . . . To use ambiguous or evasive language for the purpose of deceiving or diverting attention; misrepresent by shape or turn of statement; give a wrong color to facts in speaking or answering; quibble; shuffle. . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p.1410.
 dis-sem′ble . . . v. . . . i. . . . To put on false appearances; disguise the reality; represent a thing or things untruly. Id. at 531.
 SUB SILENTIO. Under silence ; without any notice being taken. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1129.